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Abstract 
The paper focuses on financial transactions, addressing over-the-counter (OTC) 
trading of derivatives, which many analyses of the recent financial crisis argue 
produced significant problems. This area of financial activity grew massively from 
the 1990s, facilitated by legal developments in both the US and the UK that ruled 
out any state regulation of the market whilst at the same time affirming that the 
contracts made in the area were fully legally enforceable in US and UK law. At the 
same time, the private association, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), developed the Model Contract and international private soft 
law agreements that were generally respected by national legal systems and 
provided an agreed framework for OTC contracts. The paper explores how this 
lack of public regulation was legitimated, and the interests which lay behind this 
legitimation process. It then considers how the financial crisis and the role of OTC 
derivatives forced a re-opening of the issue of how these markets should be 
regulated. The paper explores the interplay between what may be described as 
technical fixes to regulatory problems, on the one hand, and the efforts of private 
and public actors to defend their interests by shaping the new markets in particular 
ways, on the other. 
Keywords: regulation, over-the-counter derivatives, financial crisis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial markets have been highly innovative over the last two decades. The 
number of new products and variations on products which have been launched over 
this period has been immense.1 Newly invented products such as credit default 
swaps (CDS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) went from zero 
transactions to transactions that were calculated to place billions of dollars at risk, 
all within the space of a few years. The speed of diffusion of these products across 
actors, institutions and countries was dramatic and illustrated a basic problem in 
law and regulation. As the actors themselves were aware, if all such products had to 
be subject to regulatory approval or, even worse, had to be explicitly allowed for in 
law, the speed of innovation would slow to a crawl. This would have a variety of 
disadvantages to the originators of such products, e.g., nobody would be able to 
accrue first-mover advantage and rapidly establishing scale and reputation for these 
new products would be more difficult. These requirements for long regulatory 
approval processes ruled out civil law countries as potential sites for such markets 
as these systems generally embodied a presumption that unless something was 
specifically allowed by the code, it would be challengeable under the law. Civil law 
countries have therefore been generally unfavourable to financial innovation and 
financial risk. This has been reflected not just in law but in regulatory systems 
which restrict certain types of financial activity. It seems likely therefore that 
financial innovation is only going to flourish in common law systems, which are 
generally more permissive in approach. To state the obvious, therefore, financial 
innovation is more likely to occur in New York and London than elsewhere, a fact 
reflected in the dominance of these two centres in the global financial system that 
has been constructed in the last 30 years. 
However, this is not to propose a new application of the ‘law and finance’ 
approach developed by La Porta, et al.,2 in their effort to explain different systems 
of corporate governance on the basis of the difference between common law and 
civil law countries. Rather, we can think of this difference as providing a 
framework of possibilities for financial innovation but not in itself explaining how 
such innovation comes about and, more importantly for this discussion, how such 
innovations are governed and regulated even in common law settings. In other 
words, we still have to explain how these potentialities are realised and for this 
purpose it is necessary to incorporate politics and power. At least since the New 
Deal, it has been recognised that financial innovation is not an unalloyed benefit to 
society and this understanding goes across common law countries as much as 
                                                                                                                                               
1 E. Engelen, I. Erturk, J. Froud, A. Leaver and K. Williams, ‘Reconceptualizing Financial 
Innovation: Frame, Conjuncture and Bricolage’, 39 Economy and Society (2010) p. 33. 
2 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’, 106 
Journal of Political Economy (1998) p. 1113. 
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across civil law countries. On the contrary, during the heyday of the Bretton Woods 
system, fixed exchange rates, controls on flows of capital, varying levels of state 
management of fiscal and monetary matters and legal prohibitions on certain forms 
of activity and organisation all inhibited financial innovation in order to reduce the 
possibility of volatility, turmoil and financial booms and busts. The collapse of this 
system as described in numerous accounts of the rise of neo-liberalism.3 and the 
gradual establishment of deregulated financial markets particularly in the US and 
the UK changed this situation. However, this broader change still required activities 
at a more micro level in terms of particular markets, products and firms if the 
potential was to be realised. At this level, it is possible to see actors in conflict, 
expressing different perspectives, embodying different interests and, most of all, 
engaging in strategies and tactics in order to pursue their interests. Law, 
contestation and power reveal themselves in these instances. The space for financial 
innovation still has to be made and imposed against different actors and different 
potentialities. 
We should perceive these processes as happening unevenly across different 
financial markets, not as an imminent outcome of inevitable trends. We have to 
contextualise them carefully in a moving scenario of international regimes, national 
politics and the global political economy, and to understand that in this changing 
landscape, powers wax and wane depending both on circumstances and on the 
strategy and tactics pursued by actors. In this respect, the financial crisis gives us a 
useful opportunity to examine the limits of hegemony, i.e., the degree to which the 
taken-for-granted structures in particular sectors of the financial market can be 
revealed as the outcome of distinctive forms of power and politics. The financial 
crisis shows starkly who benefits and who loses from a particular structure and then 
reveals to us how public and private actors struggle to build a new order in a new 
context. 
This paper therefore focuses on a specific sector of the financial markets: that 
concerned with over-the counter (OTC) credit default swaps (CDS). What makes 
this a particularly interesting object of study is that in the run-up to the financial 
crisis, OTC CDS grew to a huge extent and were integrally involved with the 
overall expansion of CDOs, sub-prime mortgages and the subsequent balance sheet 
difficulties encountered by many financial institutions. Early analyses of the 
collapse of 2008 identified CDS products and in particular the way in which they 
were traded in OTC markets as a fundamental cause of the crash. How these 
markets operated became subject to more detailed scrutiny, and what emerged was 
a complex interplay of politicians, regulators, financial institutions and inter-
mediaries struggling to shape and reshape law and regulation by using various 
resources, theories and technologies. 
                                                                                                                                               
3 G.A. Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 2011). 
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The paper is in three sections. In the first section, the struggle over the legality of 
OTC derivatives is discussed, and it is shown that in spite of resistance, the combined 
power of industry insiders and supportive federal officials led the US to legitimate 
these products in a way that was particularly advantageous to those trading them. In 
the second section, the products themselves are discussed in more detail to show how 
and why they were capable of producing the sorts of profits that further augmented 
the legitimacy of the market and the power of the institutions which were trading 
them. In the third section, the impact of the financial crisis on this market is discussed 
and in particular how issues of law and regulation surfaced again. This shows how, in 
spite of the massive delegitimation resulting from the crisis, private actors have still 
been able to limit the degree of legal and regulatory constraint to which they have 
been subject. In the concluding section, the argument for highlighting the interaction 
of law, contestation and politics, particularly in the financial markets, is considered. 
2. OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES AND THE GROWTH OF CREDIT 
DEFAULT SWAPS 
From the early 1980s, an alternative way of trading derivatives emerged to 
challenge regulated exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, the existence of which went back over a century. Regulated 
exchanges were, as their name suggests, regulated by national regulators, and in the 
US by the Commodity and Futures Trade Commission (CFTC). They traded in 
standard contracts and the exchange itself mediated between contracting parties. 
Members deposited margin calls so that in the event of a crisis with one member, 
liquidity was not entirely lost. Individual members might become insolvent but the 
exchange ensured that this did not spread to other members. 
Over-the-counter trading grew as an alternative to exchange trading and in 
quantitative terms soon outstripped it. For example, measured by amounts 
outstanding in US dollars, the OTC derivatives market in June 2009 was worth 
approximately $604 trillion compared to around $72 trillion outstanding on 
organised exchanges (Bank for International Settlements, 2009a.4 and 2009b.5). Why 
did this occur? This is a complex question which requires much further research. 
However, there are two elements that are relevant. The first is the nature of OTC 
contracts and in particular their flexibility and profitability. The second element is 
the nature of regulation of these contracts – or more precisely the lack of regulation. 
In relation to OTC contracts themselves, as invented in the 1980s, they were 
bilateral, between two parties who determined the nature of the product traded and 
                                                                                                                                               
4 Bank for International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review June 2009 (Basel, BIS 2009a). 
5 Bank for International Settlements, OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Half of 
2008 (Basel, BIS 2009b). 
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the price for the product. A theme which is continuously emphasised by proponents 
of OTC trading is its flexibility. This refers to a number of features of the 
relationship between buyer and seller. Whilst there is some standardisation of the 
contract underpinning the trades coming from ISDA’s model agreement and 
subsequent amendments,6 the actual content of the trade is determined by the two 
parties to the contract. This means that there are no fixed terms to contracts and no 
fixed units: parties to the contract make deals for as short or as long as they want, as 
big or as small as they want. They can create whatever sort of underlying assets 
they wish – a crucial point when in the period from 2001 collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) based on packages of asset-backed securities (.particularly those 
associated with sub-prime mortgages) were being developed in investment banks at 
a rapid rate. These CDOs were highly diverse not just in that they were ultimately 
dependent on many individual loans with their own distinctive characteristics, but 
also in the way these were placed into tranches and further rebundled into CDOs.7 
Central to the construction of these deals was the development of CDS, which in 
theory offered a way for the purchasers of CDOs to offset any credit risk associated 
with their purchase by buying a form of protection. The flexibility of the OTC 
market to tailor CDS contracts to the exact specifications required by the producers 
of the CDOs was crucial to underpinning the huge growth of this market in the 
period 2001-2007. 
Key to this was the regulatory position of OTC markets, which developed in the 
1990s up to the financial crash. In the US, the OTC derivatives market had 
developed during the 1980s and 1990s in a state of legal uncertainty about the 
enforceability of the contracts through the courts. Stout argues that this was because 
‘American common law has long refused to enforce off-exchange contracts of sale 
not intended to be settled by delivery of the good or service in question’.8 In the 
US, such contracts were therefore seen as a form of gambling. By contrast, she 
argues that the Financial Services Act of 1986 in the UK eliminated ‘the old rule 
against difference contracts … making all financial derivatives, whether used for 
speculation, legally enforceable’.9 This left US derivatives traders at a potential 
competitive disadvantage compared to those based in the UK and in the period up 
to 1998 debate grew in the US about how to resolve this situation. OTC traders in 
the US were keen to regularise the situation and make OTC derivatives legally 
enforceable rather than occupying a shadowland of uncertainty. Although this 
uncertainty did not stop the market growing, it occasionally revealed itself when 
                                                                                                                                               
6 G. Morgan, ‘Market Formation and Governance in International Financial Markets: The 
Case of OTC Derivatives’, 61 Human Relations (2008) p. 637. 
7 D. MacKenzie and Y. Millo, ‘Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The Historical 
Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange’, 109 American Journal of Sociology (2003) p. 107. 
8 L.A. Stout, ‘Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
Market for OTC Derivatives’, 48 Duke Law Journal (1999) p. 701. 
9 L.A. Stout, ‘Why We Need Derivatives Regulation’, New York Times, 7 October 2009. 
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organisations outside the financial sector (most notably Gibson Greetings, Proctor 
& Gamble and Orange County) lost large amounts of money on OTC derivatives 
trading and then went to the US courts filing lawsuits challenging the enforceability 
of these agreements.10 
By 1998, it was clear that there was going to be some sort of clearing up of the 
legal position of OTC markets with Brooksley Born, head of the CFTC, proposing 
an end to OTC, and OTC traders themselves supporting the legal enforceability of 
the contracts. According to an article in the New York Times,11 Born’s efforts in 
1997-98 to institute regulation over OTC derivatives were fiercely opposed by key 
figures such as Alan Greenspan at the Fed, Robert Rubin and Larry Summers in the 
Clinton Treasury Department and Arthur Levitt at the SEC, who in turn were 
strongly supported in their opposition by the industry. Born’s original proposal to 
include the banning of OTC markets in a new law was rejected and she left the 
CFTC in 1999. A report from the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
(consisting of Summers, Greenspan, Levitt and Rainer) was published in November 
1999.12 This report argued in favour of clearing up the legal position of OTC 
derivatives in the US system and, further, of legally taking them out of the purview 
of any of the US regulators, particularly the CFTC; both of these recommendations 
were followed in the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act (CFMA) 2000. Stout 
states that 
the CFMA not only declared financial derivatives exempt from CFTC or SEC 
oversight, it also declared all financial derivatives legally enforceable. The 
CFMA thus eliminated in one fell swoop, a legal constraint on derivatives 
speculation that dated back not just decades, but centuries. It was this change in 
the law – not some flash of genius on Wall Street – that created today’s $600 
trillion financial derivatives market.13 
Glass also describes this Act as a ‘famous victory’ for swap dealers who ‘have 
historically opposed increased regulation of OTC derivatives’.14 Tett states that 
CFMA specifically 
stressed that ‘swaps’ were not futures or securities and thus could not be 
controlled by the CFTC or SEC or any other single regulators. ‘Congress nailed 
the door shut in 2000 [on unified regulation], with the passage of the 
                                                                                                                                               
10  Stout, supra n. 8, at p. 779. 
11  P.S. Goodman, ‘The Reckoning: Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy’, New 
York Times, 9 October 2008. 
12  Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, Report of the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Washington, DC. 1999). 
13  Stout, supra n. 9. 
14  A.W. Glass, ‘The Regulatory Drive Towards Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC 
Derivatives and the Necessary Limits on This’, 4 Capital Markets Law Journal (2009) p. S79. 
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Commodities Futures Modernization Act’ observed ISDA lobbyist Mark 
Brickell. The derivatives sector was jubilant.15 
Born’s arguments for banning OTC derivatives centred around two issues. The first 
issue continued the old critique identified by Stout and others that these contracts 
were essentially a form of gambling. As Mackenzie and Millo show in their 
discussion of exchange-traded derivatives, it was possible to launch an alternative 
interpretation in which the contracts were more ‘scientific’ in nature due to the way 
in which pricing now reflected a developed theory of finance.16 However, this 
argument only worked in the eyes of Born, et al., so long as the products were 
traded on a regulated exchange, where in effect the gambling element could be 
monitored and controlled. Absent that environment and the consequence was a 
return to pure gambling. Furthermore, Born identified the systemic risks which 
were emerging as OTC contracts grew in scale and scope; they were encouraging 
more and more speculation and the degree to which they were being used to hedge 
against specific risks was reducing compared to the degree to which they had 
become useful instruments for speculation. Because there was no central register, it 
was impossible to determine where risks were being held; the argument that this 
system was spreading risk was judged to be wishful thinking that did not 
correspond to the increased amount of trading between the large financial 
institutions (see Born 2001 for a cautious overview of those years).17 
Born’s arguments were crushed under the weight of professional and practi-
tioner opinion that the OTC derivatives were making the market more efficient. The 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets consisted of academic economists 
and central bankers who supported the process of deregulation in financial markets. 
For them, OTC derivatives explained to a degree how potentially catastrophic 
collapses in particular regions or sectors (such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
8) had been contained. Because institutions had bought and sold derivatives in 
order to hedge risks, the impact of collapses was diffused. This argument was 
reinforced in the light of the dot.com crash and the collapses of Enron and other 
large US companies at the turn of the millennium. 
3. MARKETS, PRODUCTS AND POWER 
It is important to identify the effects of this process in terms of politics and power. 
Effectively what occurred was that the largest institutions in the financial sector 
                                                                                                                                               
15  G. Tett, Fool’s Gold (London, Little, Brown 2009), at p. 87. 
16  MacKenzie and Millo, supra n. 7. 
17  B. Born, ‘International Regulatory Responses to Derivatives Crises: The Role of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’, 21 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business (2001) p. 607. 
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became hugely more profitable (and more risky) as a result of their ability to trade 
these sorts of products without regulatory oversight. The degree of profitability of 
the financial sector in the golden years between 2002 and 2007 created a coalition 
consisting of insiders to the industry, supporters of free markets inside the 
economic profession and the regulatory bodies and governments content with the 
tax take from these rich institutions and individuals. The cognitive and normative 
narratives of the advantages of free markets went along with powerful isomorphic 
forces as expressed by Citicorp Chief Executive Chuck Prince, who said in July 
2007: ‘When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But 
as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still 
dancing’. Alongside this, there was a more prosaic instrumental narrative – 
everybody, from the consumer using debt instruments such as mortgages and credit 
cards to fund current consumption, through to industries and nations which 
depended on this expanding consumption in the US, through to the banks 
intermediating between savers and borrowers on a global scale and generating huge 
earnings for themselves, their shareholders and their traders, appeared to be 
enjoying the benefits of this deregulation, even if it was clear that certain people 
were benefiting more than others. Neither governments nor the main financial 
institutions were willing to heed the warnings of isolated individuals betting against 
the market.18 or, more importantly, the worries of institutions such as the Basel 
Committee about the degree of leverage and risk in the financial system. The period 
saw a massively powerful reinforcement of the view that deregulation had been 
correct policy as huge profits flowed around the financial system. Yet this was an 
artefact both of the lack of regulation per se and in particular of the way in which 
the ‘free market’ enabled the accumulation, under specific conditions, of vast ‘risk 
free’ profits. 
These dynamics worked themselves out in a variety of ways across different 
parts of the financial markets. This paper focuses particularly on OTC credit default 
swaps. At their peak in December 2007, credit default swaps constituted almost 
10% of the total notional amounts outstanding on OTC derivatives. Credit default 
swaps were ‘invented’ very recently. Tett.19 describes how in 1994 JP Morgan 
bankers first put together the concept of a contract which would protect a lender 
against the default of any loans which it had made. Over the following few years, 
they worked through some of the technical details of such a product, first selling it 
in late 1997.20 The first separate entry for CDS contracts in the BIS quarterly 
reports on the OTC derivatives market occurred in 2005 and it stated that notional 
amounts outstanding on these contracts were approximately $10 trillion by mid-
                                                                                                                                               
18  M. Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (London, Allen Lane 2010). 
19  Tett, supra n. 15, ch. 1. 
20  M. Phillips, ‘The Monster That Ate Wall Street: How “Credit Default Swaps” – An Insurance 
Against Bad Loans – Turned from a Smart Bet into a Killer’, Newsweek, 27 September 2008. 
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2005. By December 2007, the notional amount outstanding on OTC credit default 
swaps was around $58 trillion, an almost 6-fold increase in the space of just over 
two years.21 
From the perspective taken in this paper, it is important to understand how this 
market worked and where power, profitability and risk lay. OTC CDS deals 
depended on a supply side in which there had been initial high levels of investment 
in expertise, model building, calculating systems, back office and IT support. 
Because of the complexity and scale of these investments, only the largest financial 
institutions were capable of being ‘producers’, particularly of the more exotic OTC 
derivatives. It was they who built the products and proceeded to market and sell 
them to other financial institutions. However, once they had made such 
investments, the marginal costs of selling more contracts was practically zero in 
‘production’ terms. There was no ‘production’ limit to the market; the only limit 
was how many such contracts the markets could absorb at the prices which the 
producers wanted to charge. 
These large financial institutions, aided by inter-dealer brokers, brought together 
potential counterparties to OTC CDS contracts. Broadly conceived, one of the 
counterparties would be willing to take on the risk of default on a particular bond in 
return for a steady flow of income; the other party would be willing to pay a regular 
fee in return for the possibility of being repaid in full if the bond defaulted. The 
main purchasers of risk in the early part of this period included AIG (Financial 
Products division) and the monolines, though the ‘producers’ were willing to hold 
one end of the trade themselves on their own books if it looked profitable. As the 
crisis began to unfold in 2007-8, the investment banks, in fact, found themselves 
holding more of the risk than originally envisaged. The other counterparties to the 
contract, i.e., those seeking to hedge their risks on bonds (or, as increasingly 
happened, speculating on the collapse of bonds) included hedge funds, middle-
range banks, insurers, institutional investors and corporate treasurers. Where the 
large financial institutions intermediated directly between the two counterparties by 
negotiating two separate back-to-back contracts, they aimed to squeeze the 
payments to the risk taker as low as possible and push the payment obligations of 
the risk seller as high as possible. Because the markets were not transparent and 
prices were not visible across the trading community and, more particularly, 
amongst the ultimate buyers and sellers of the contracts, there was higher 
information asymmetry than might normally be expected in wholesale financial 
markets. In particular, the intermediating financial institutions had the highest 
chance of collecting the most relevant information on particular buyers and sellers, 
on spreads being offered and accepted, on the specifics of risk in contracts, and of 
adjusting their spreads and their willingness to hold risk themselves. Towards the 
                                                                                                                                               
21  Bank for International Settlements, New Developments in Clearing and Settlement 
Arrangements for OTC Derivatives (Basel, BIS 2007). 
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end of the boom period, this led some banks, most notably Goldman Sachs, to 
significantly readjust their market position in OTC CDS as they began to perceive 
the fragility of the boom and the likelihood of the coming crisis. 
Traders in these financial institutions became so powerful since it was their job 
to find the buyers and the sellers, to make the market, and, in this way, to create 
profits (and their own bonuses) through a combination of fee income and spread 
differentials on contracts that had varying durations. In theory, if not in practice, the 
systems were in place to process as many deals as the traders could push through. 
OTC CDS markets were therefore strongly driven by the supply side organising the 
market, creating the products and drawing in other actors. 
Having a strong and powerful sell side does not, however, guarantee an equally 
extensive buy side in the market. As already described, what was crucial for OTC 
CDS was that the buy side was not restricted to hedging. Under English and US 
law, there was no requirement for Company A to have an actual ‘insurable interest’ 
in the bonds issued by Company B, i.e., it did not have to own any of the bonds. 
Clearly, from the point of view of a holder of bonds, to be able to hedge the credit 
risk was potentially useful depending on the spread. But this was a relatively 
limited market. The fact that it was not necessary to hold the bond to take out a 
CDS contract on it was crucial to extending the market dramatically. That this was 
successfully achieved is reflected in the fact that the total amount of CDS contracts 
outstanding far outweighed the total amount of bonds issued and the value at risk in 
the original assets. Zabel, for example, calculated that the ‘corporate bond, 
municipal bond and structured investment vehicles market totaled less than $25 
trillion’ and therefore $20 trillion of the total $45 trillion notional value of CDS 
contracts in 2007 were speculative ‘bets’ on the possibility of a credit event of a 
specific credit asset not owned by either party to the CDS contract.22 Stout comes 
up with different figures which state the issue even more dramatically in that ‘by 
the end of that year [2008], the notional value of the CDS market had reached $67 
trillion. At the same time the total market value of all the underlying bonds issued 
by US companies outstanding was only $15 trillion’.23 
This reflects the fact that the demand side of the CDS market was not simply a 
way of hedging risks that had been taken on as a result of a credit deal. It was also a 
way of speculating on price movements in the markets in terms of both the value of 
the underlying asset and the changing spreads of the CDS contract. Using CDS for 
speculation involved taking a short position on the asset in the belief that the odds 
on a form of credit default were not being estimated properly by the holders of the 
risk. Subsequent to the crisis, the identity of some of the individuals, hedge funds 
and traders within financial institutions who took on these bets, against the market 
                                                                                                                                               
22  R. Zabel, ‘Credit Default Swaps: From Protection to Speculation’ (2008), available at: 
<http://www.rkmc.com/Credit-Default-Swaps-From-Protection-To-Speculation.htm>. 
23  Stout, supra n. 9. 
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as a whole, have become identified, e.g., most notably John Paulson.24 CDS became 
classic instruments for taking short positions because they had known and limited 
costs (the premium which was being paid) but the potential of a huge upside. For 
much of the period between 2002 and 2007, CDS contracts were being sold at a 
relatively low spread because the buyers of risk thought the probability of default 
was very low. Even with low costs, however, hedge funds betting against the 
market had to endure a long period when they were haemorrhaging funds and 
receiving no returns. As risk and uncertainty started to be revealed in 2007, spreads 
widened, changing the nature of the market and who was willing to participate and 
on what terms. 
It is important to note that, as has been already emphasised, the large investment 
banks who were producing these contracts sat between buyers and sellers in 
multiple ways that allowed them to earn fees from sales and profits from the spread 
whilst minimising the risks which they themselves held. Much of this arises from 
the very nature of OTC trading, which is that it is bilateral, customised and opaque. 
In other words, it is difficult to compare prices. In 2009, an FT article commented 
that ‘dealers had every incentive to keep the market opaque and bespoke, which 
boosted margins – and profits’.25 
A further crucial feature of this market related to the lack of regulation 
regarding the posting of collateral. Insurance companies work on the basis of 
matching assets to calculable risks. Insurance supervisors specify the reserves that 
are required to cover the risks taken by the insurance company and link these to the 
premiums to be paid for cover. Insurance companies are therefore relatively low on 
leverage, high on reserves and unspectacular in terms of profit and pay. A CDS 
contract, however, was explicitly not defined as an insurance contract and therefore 
not subject to insurance regulation. A CDS was created as a contract on a financial 
market which was constructed on the basis of finance theory and the mechanisms of 
this market.26 The guarantee that a risk holder of a CDS contract could meet the 
obligations of this contract was not vested in any state regulator but in the 
mechanisms of the market and in particular in the system of collateral depositing. 
Rules on collateral depositing were the province of ISDA and embedded in the 
Master Agreement and the various guidelines issued by ISDA. In principle, the 
seller would deposit with the buyer collateral (usually cash and government 
securities) as a demonstration of its ability to meet the terms of the contract. ISDA 
set out rules concerning how the level of collateral should move up or down 
depending on changing market conditions.27 
                                                                                                                                               
24  Lewis, supra n. 18. 
25  N. Bullock, M. Mackenzie and G. Tett, ‘CDS Market’s Big Bang Arrives’, Financial 
Times (London), 7 April 2009. 
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How the collateral system developed in practice over the decade before the 
financial crisis reveals a rather complex and changing picture. One particular group 
of companies which were selling CDS products on ABS CDOs, the so-called 
‘monolines’ (the biggest of which were Ambac and MBIA), posted no collateral at 
all on the contracts which they struck. Monolines had emerged initially as insurers 
of municipal bond issuers and were regulated by the New York Insurance Depart-
ment. The rules of this regulator would have made the posting of collateral 
prohibitively expensive but rather than not enter the market, the monolines, in 
Glass’s words ‘for years fought pitched battles with the risk departments of the 
swap dealers and when the dust settled the rule was established that AAA-rated 
monolines did not post collateral on CDS’.28 The AAA rating was given to the 
monolines by the rating agencies on the grounds that they had never defaulted and 
their financial underpinnings were sound. A similar rating was given to AIG FP, the 
London-based arm of the large US insurance group, which sold large numbers of 
CDS contracts. Therefore, AIG FP also did not post collateral, working on the basis 
that its parent company had sufficient funds to back up any potential problems. 
ISDA, under pressure from BIS, became more active from the late 1990s, firstly 
in tracking the amount of collateral being posted and secondly in encouraging 
members to post more. It began to conduct regular Margin and Collateral Surveys, 
which were published on the ISDA website. These surveys indicate that there has 
been a gradual rise in collateral agreements from an estimated 12,000 in 2000 to 
around 150,000 in 2009.29 Up until 2007, the total estimated collateral in the whole 
OTC market according to ISDA was approximately $1.3 trillion, though since then 
it has tripled, an indication of the more cautious attitude to collateral which has 
emerged after the crisis. This compares to a total notional commitment for CDS 
contracts alone of $57 trillion and a total of $516 trillion for the market as a whole 
according to BIS data.30 The ISDA Margin Survey in 2009 shows that in the period 
from 2004 to 2007, the total reported collateral went up from $1,017 trillion in 
2004, to $1,209 trillion in 2005, to $1,329 trillion in 2006 and to $1,335 in 2007.31 
At the same time, the OTC global market had more than doubled from $251,823 
trillion in December 2004 to $595,341 trillion in December 2007.32 As the crisis 
revealed, collateral levels were far too low when the underlying assets began to fail 
on a systemic basis and sellers of protection were called on to recompense the 
purchasers of CDS contracts. 
However, contracts did contain conditionality clauses on the posting of margin 
and collateral. Whilst under normal conditions these postings were very low, should 
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conditions change they could rise steeply. For example, the scale of collateral 
requiring to be posted was linked to the value of the underlying assets so that as this 
fell and the likelihood of the CDS seller having to recompense the CDS buyer rose, 
so more collateral was required. The level of collateral to be posted was also linked 
with the credit rating of the CDS seller since this indicated to other actors in the 
market whether the seller had the capital to meet any obligations potentially arising 
from defaults in the assets which underlay the CDS. If the rating of a seller was 
lowered, the seller would suddenly become subject to a potentially heavy call for 
collateral (as eventually happened to AIG in September 2008, leaving a huge hole 
in AIG’s balance sheet and requiring a massive injection of capital from the US 
government).33 This potential for collateral shift would be exacerbated because 
institutional investors would have to sell off the underlying assets (i.e., the CDOs) 
if the rating changed down from Triple A. Such sell-offs clearly led to a further fall 
in their value, requiring further posting of collateral by the CDS sellers to meet the 
gap between the guaranteed price and the market value. 
Up to this point, however, investment banks were able to earn huge profits in 
this market in a variety of ways. Firstly, they could scale up their sales at low 
marginal cost. Secondly, they were able to charge fees in a market which lacked 
transparency and where buyers were unable to compare prices. Thirdly, they could 
issue these contracts with very little requirement to hold appropriate capital. 
Fourthly, they were able to offset the risk by setting up contracts with the 
monolines and AIG, usually at a rate significantly below that which they were 
charging the original buyer of the contract. 
The OTC CDS market was therefore a very particular type of market. It was 
dominated by a small number of CDS sellers feeding a large number of market 
participants with different requirements. This feeding process was structured by an 
opaque pricing system where what was actually being sold also became 
increasingly complex and difficult to understand, particularly in terms of the 
interdependencies of risk. How and why did this market develop and grow? The 
answer lies in the flexibility it delivered to many of its key participants, the 
profitability it generated for some, the opportunities for speculating that it provided 
to others and, finally, its role in serving and promoting the larger market of CDOs, 
securitisation and the expansion of consumer credit on which the US and the UK 
depended in economic and political terms. Because it was unregulated, it could 
respond speedily to new opportunities or rather create new opportunities without 
bothering with the traditional panoply of regulation in financial markets which 
required appropriate levels of reserve. Ultimately, the scale of profits was so large 
because risks were under-provisioned and under-priced; risks were under-
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provisioned because regulation was absent and it was left to the private actors to 
determine their own levels of provision, which they set very low; risks were under-
priced for reasons that related to sustaining and growing businesses in an 
environment where external monitoring of pricing was non-existent. Thus, when 
the underlying risky assets (i.e., the subprime mortgages) lost value, the 
consequences were magnified because of the lack of adequate provisioning and the 
degree of speculative activity drawn to the area by the under-pricing of risk. 
4. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE RESPONSE OF REGULATORS AND 
POLITICIANS 
The previous section has identified what was at stake in the boom period. The lack 
of regulation and law enabled the investment banks to build a model of super-
profitability in the sphere of OTC trading in CDS products with very little 
monitoring or supervision. At the same time, the interdependencies which had 
grown in the financial system between commercial and investment banking, 
between savers, borrowers and the financial markets, and between governments and 
the financial sector had created a number of institutions which were ‘too big to 
fail’. Once the markets froze after Lehmans was allowed to fail, governments 
seemed to face the potential for a complete collapse of the financial sector. In the 
end, they opted for rescues that placed public money either directly or indirectly 
behind the banking system. The fact that, in the initial stages, much of this public 
money went straight into paying off OTC CDS contracts that had fallen due as a 
result of potential defaults placed this part of the market directly into the public eye. 
AIG was the most graphic example of this, having to pay out much of the capital 
provided by the US government to its counterparties in OTC CDS contracts, many 
of whom were based in Europe. Thus, US funds bolstered the recapitalisation of the 
European banking system, creating huge political controversy. Therefore, when 
governments came to identify the causes of the crisis, one of their first targets was 
the OTC CDS market. 
From early on, a consensus emerged across the most important governments and 
regulators (the US, the UK and the EU, working through the G20) that the key 
mechanism to attack the problems arising from OTC derivatives and CDS contracts 
in particular was the forcing of more of this business onto regulated exchanges and 
central clearing houses.34 The Obama administration, through Treasury Secretary 
Geithner, pledged to pursue legislation to mandate clearing of all standardised 
derivatives through regulated central counterparties (CCPs) as well as making 
obligatory what are described as robust margin requirements. Under the proposed 
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system there would be more recordkeeping and reporting requirements including an 
audit trail on all OTC derivatives as well as pressure to move as many contracts as 
possible not just into CCPs but, if possible, onto regulated exchanges. The EU also 
supported the idea of CCPs. This agreement was the basis of intensive international 
cooperation through the G20 in April 2009, which declared that ‘we will promote 
the standardisation and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular 
through the establishment of central clearing counterparties subject to effective 
regulation and supervision’.35 
At the September 2009 meeting of the G20 in Pittsburgh, the following Decla-
ration was adopted: 
All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties by end 2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be 
reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject 
to higher capital requirements. We ask the [Financial Stability Board] and its 
relevant members to assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient 
to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk and 
protect against market abuse.36 
What the governments and regulators particularly wanted to achieve was a situation 
where the failure of a counterparty could be contained and would not spread out 
and contaminate the system as a whole. One obvious route in this direction would 
have been to ban OTC products and insist instead that derivatives be traded on 
regulated exchanges. In the US, this argument was briefly pushed by Barney Franks 
in the House, but in spite of the crash and of the clear role of OTC CDS contracts in 
the crash, this argument did not garner significant support. To force everything onto 
regulated exchanges would have closed down large areas of business for big banks. 
In spite of the strong words at the G20 April 2009 summit, no major political leader 
has actually pushed for this complete ban. The anticipated push-back by the 
financial institutions, the inter-dealer brokers and some of the clients, together with 
the support of many economists and commentators for the idea that the OTC 
market was efficient, seemed too powerful even in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis to take on directly. 
Instead, what has emerged has been an effort to create what might be described 
as a technical fix to the problem alongside a process of political manoeuvring in 
which private actors and public regulators negotiate how the new rules will impact 
on previous business models. This technical fix consists of two parts. The first part 
is to mandate that details of contracts be provided to trade depositories, which, in 
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turn, can collate the data and pass it on to the regulators. The aim of this is to ensure 
that risks in the system are visible and action can be taken by regulators to relieve 
pressure. The second associated part is that most transactions will move onto 
central clearing parties (CCPs) where the CCP stands between the contracting 
parties. In the event of a counterparty failing, the loss is absorbed by the CCP on 
the basis of the margins and collaterals which it has collected from its members. 
CCPs differ from regulated exchanges in that prices are not publicly posted but 
continue to be negotiated bilaterally and products need not be as standardised as on 
regulated exchanges. CCPs set rules for margins and collaterals, clear trades and are 
able to assess the degree and nature of risk amongst clearing house members. 
These technical fixes are currently proceeding in a highly political context. One 
context concerns the various private actors engaged in this process and their efforts to 
shape the outcome with the end of 2012 being the initial target for key areas of 
implementation. The second context relates to the politics of public actors, including 
tensions between levels of supervision and regulation, i.e., national, regional and 
global, and tensions across different national jurisdictions. The range of issues which 
are being discussed is too large for a short paper to consider in full, but it is possible 
to briefly describe the different actors in these processes and their interests. 
In terms of private actors, it is possible to identify a range of different responses 
as well as the emergence of a rather different array of financial institutions 
positioning themselves in this new market structure. 
Firstly, there are those actors who are most integrally embedded in the OTC 
markets, such as inter-dealer brokers. This group is most vociferous in its efforts to 
defend the viability and utility of OTC contracts in some areas of business. For 
example, Terry Smith, Chief Executive of Tullett Prebon, one of the brokers in the 
market, wrote in the FT that OTC market products are 
of necessity bespoke instruments and contracts, traded in large amounts between 
professional participants: and as such, they are the antithesis of an exchange-
traded product. If OTC business is driven to these unsuitable venues, markets 
will become less efficient, which is an outcome we should seek to avoid.37 
In his analysis, Glass also argues that ‘the intrinsic complexity of some OTC credit 
derivatives is likely to prevent electronic confirmation and CCP clearing from 
taking hold for those products’.38 The OTC system worked on the basis of non-
standardisation; products were custom built and unique to the particular contract. 
They could vary across multiple characteristics of size, time, conditions, collateral 
and margin calls, etc. The proponents of OTC argue that this is a highly useful 
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function for buyers and sellers that provides them with maximum flexibility. 
Support for OTC trading has also come from non-financial firms, such as the 160 
firms represented in the letter of the European Association of Corporate Treasurers 
who wrote to the European Commission requesting that any new regulation not 
require them to put down collateral. Banks have supported this and continue to 
argue in favour of OTC markets, particularly in the area of currency derivatives 
because they are perceived as incurring cost and reducing flexibility compared to 
OTC markets. 
The second group of private actors that have become more significant are those 
who are going to benefit from proposals to push more trading into a transparent 
format. These are not traders, buyers or sellers but the organisations which 
construct the different sorts of platforms on which markets exist, prices are posted, 
exchanges take place, clearing occurs, contracts are registered and potential 
liabilities monitored and adjusted. Trade depositories, for example, such as DTCC 
(Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation), have been developing for some time 
and are now aiming to become more highly involved with OTC business. Other 
organisations have predominantly provided clearing facilities for exchanges and 
they too are aiming to extend that perhaps into running exchanges themselves (such 
as LCH Clearnet). Others have been based primarily in the running of exchanges, 
with some having long expertise in derivatives trading (such as the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange with its various markets overseas). Others were founded 
much more recently. For example, Intercontinental Exchange (known as ICE) was 
established in 2000 to deal in energy futures, but following its IPO and the recent 
pressures to extend CCP and exchange coverage for derivatives, it has expanded in 
this area. In March 2009, ICE acquired The Clearing Corporation (TCC), which 
provides the clearing technology for ICE’s credit default swap clearing house, ICE 
Trust. On 10 March 2009, ICE Trust became the first clearing house to process 
North American CDS. In July of the same year, ICE introduced clearing for 
European CDS through ICE Clear Europe CDS. 
ICE has also become involved in the broader merger and acquisition movement 
in stock exchanges, which has been stimulated by the potential massive growth 
arising from the shift out of OTC markets. This is reflected in the bid for NYSE 
Euronext by Deutsche Börse in early 2011, which was accepted by the NYSE 
Euronext board but subsequently challenged by an alternative bid from a 
consortium of ICE and NASDAQ. The proposed merger later collapsed in February 
2012 when the European Commission ruled that it would have created a ‘near 
monopoly’ in European financial derivatives. A similar effort to increase scale and 
opportunities to benefit from these regulatory changes is reflected in the agreed 
merger between the London Stock Exchange group and TMX, the biggest exchange 
operator in Canada, though again this has been challenged by a bid from the Maple 
Group, a consortium of Canada-based banks and pension fund organisations. The 
LSE/TMX deal also collapsed in the face of hostility and uncertainty in Canada. 
The Maple Group bid has received cautious regulatory approval from Canadian 
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authorities but is not yet complete as competition concerns do continue and some 
shareholders are reluctant to approve (as of March 2012). Although the M+A 
activity in this area has been hampered by competition concerns, the basic logic is 
clear – to build massive exchange capabilities that can be adapted to new areas 
(such as OTC) and new regulatory requirements. Such large-scale organisations can 
maximise the scale and utilisation of back and middle offices in order to cut costs 
and attract business as well as provide access to multiple products and services. 
They can set up clearing houses in various contexts, leveraging their existing assets. 
Although these organisations have diverse origins and different sorts of assets, they 
share a common interest in pushing OTCs into CCPs. 
It is interesting to note that this reflects the introduction of a powerful new set of 
interests into the debate on changes in regulation governing OTC markets. In the 
previous era, there was a clear demarcation between the regulated exchanges, such 
as CME and Euronext, and the OTC markets. Defending the OTC border, i.e., the 
territory in which OTC can operate untrammelled, may still be of concern to some 
providers but the bigger issue now is about the territory the other side of that line, 
i.e., where various forms of market transparency and regulation are being proposed. 
The spur to the mergers is initially the recognition that this will be where the 
expansion will come, and even if the exact parameters of these markets are yet to be 
agreed, it is important to get in a position to compete for that business. In effect, 
then, the regulators find themselves with a new and powerful set of globally 
organised allies (the exchanges) to make this new system work. 
Where does this leave the big financial institutions that were so central to the 
previous system? In September 2009, the Financial Times reported that 15 banks 
(including Barclays Capital, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman 
Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley) had promised the Fed to clear the 
majority of interest rate derivatives and credit default swaps through central 
counterparties by the end of the year. This reflected the Fed’s concern that financial 
institutions were dragging their feet and trying to limit their usage of CCPs in order 
to keep their costs down, their flexibility high and their trades opaque. What 
became known as the G-14 banks have become heavily involved with industry 
associations such as ISDA and SIFMA in responding to the proposals of regulators 
under the Dodd-Frank Act. These negotiations have, predictably in many respects, 
become highly protracted, not least because the regulations involve both the SEC 
and the CFTC and have impacts on many aspects of banks and brokerages. 
Whilst there are many complex and technical elements to their responses, one 
aspect which has emerged strongly, particularly in the recent ISDA response to 
SEC proposals on the clearing houses, has been the issue of size.39 In particular 
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ISDA has been critical of the SEC for setting a $50 million minimum for an entity 
to become a member of a clearing house. ISDA argues that this (a) is too small to 
deal with potential risk, and (b) since the rule is ambiguous about whether the same 
$50m can count for membership in multiple clearing houses leads to the potential 
for cross-contamination. Instead, ISDA proposes a far larger minimum capital 
requirement of $1bn. It also argues that clearing members should not be able to 
circumvent these rules by arranging credit lines with larger organisations. These 
and other aspects of the G14 proposals push the advantages of scale to the new 
market structure and can be seen as ways of reducing competition beyond the large 
players. 
At one level, it seems that the US regulators and the Dodd-Frank Act were 
successful in reshaping the terrain of OTC markets. The momentum for CCPs has 
built and the large banks have begun a process of restructuring away from the 
previous opaque bilateral model into a more transparent era. Clearly, this will mean 
a change in the pattern of earnings for these institutions compared to the role which 
OTC CDS trading took on before the crash. However, there is a continuing struggle 
over how to implement Dodd-Frank rules and this has engaged vast resources from 
industry lobbyists. It is still far from clear how the rules will affect the various 
actors in the OTC market. 
Not surprisingly, this has created a highly complex situation in which it is still 
hard to see what sort of regime will emerge. On 5 April 2011, for example, 
Bloomberg reported the New York Fed Chairman, William Dudley, as stating that 
Wall Street’s largest banks and money managers had failed to fulfil their 
commitments to put more than 90% of eligible trades into clearing houses by 2010. 
This followed the letter from the G-14 and industry associations which expressed 
concerns about achieving the end-2012 target because of potential inconsistencies, 
failure to take into account potential for operational risk, and market disruption if 
implementation proceeded at an unrealistic, expedited pace. The dual-track 
approach of voluntary compliance by the institutions supported by clear rules from 
the regulators seemed to be in danger of breaking down. 
The terrain for public actors is equally complex. In a recent Progress Report on 
Implementation of OTC Derivatives Market Reforms (April 2011), the Financial 
Stability Board reported on its survey of country members. It stated that 
the responses show substantial variation across jurisdictions in the pace of 
implementing the recommendations in the October Report and the resulting 
progress toward achieving the G-20 commitments on standardisation, central 
clearing, exchange or platform trading and reporting to trade depositories.40 
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In spite of the difficulties noted, the US was still reported to be furthest along in terms 
of implementation whilst the report stated that in the EU ‘legislation has been 
proposed and is expected to be adopted by end-2011 with respect to clearing and 
reporting to trade repositories and is in the pre-proposal consultation stage regarding 
trading’.41 In March 2012, the European Commission stated that the European 
Supervisory Authorities would develop the technical standards necessary to 
implement the reforms by 30 September 2012 so that they could be fully adopted by 
the Commission at the end of 2012, with CCPs having to apply for authorisation at 
the latest six months after the adoption of the technical standards, i.e., by mid-2013.42 
In both the EU and the US, therefore, there remains uncertainty about both the 
standards themselves and the timescale. The clear problem amongst public actors is 
the potential that rules in different jurisdictions allow firms to pursue strategies of 
regulatory arbitrage, shifting to the systems with the lower standards. This is a 
particular issue with regard to the UK, which in the period leading up to the crisis 
had overtaken the US in terms of OTC activity and where the government and the 
companies have a strong interest in preserving their market position. Complicating 
this further is the combination of change in the UK regulatory system stemming 
from the commitment of the coalition government to enhance the Bank of 
England’s authority over financial markets, at the same time as the tier of EU 
governance of financial markets has shifted from the Lamfalussy committees to the 
status of the three European Supervisory Authorities on Banking (based in 
London), on Insurance and Pensions (based in Frankfurt) and on Securities and 
Markets (based in Paris), which are supposed to have power over the City 
institutions. It remains unclear how this will work, particularly as the UK 
government continues to see the competitiveness of the City in relation to 
derivatives markets as central to the economy.43 
On top of these national and regional regulators, there are efforts to ensure 
consistency and coherence in regulations in different contexts through the influence 
of global bodies. Organisations such as the Financial Stability Board, IOSCO, the 
OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (OSDG), and the activities of the Bank for 
International Settlements Committees on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) 
and the Global Financial System are jointly and singly producing reports and 
recommendations on implementation processes. As the G-14 letter previously 
discussed makes clear, private actors have concerns about this which go beyond 
issues of regulatory arbitrage to problems of overlap, duplication, inconsistency, 
and uncoordinated, uneven and unsynchronised implementation. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, therefore, there has emerged more law and regulation around OTC trading 
in the aftermath of the crisis. Private actors rapidly saw off efforts to outlaw such 
trades altogether. Instead, they have been lobbying governments to provide 
themselves with some room for manoeuvre in the new context. They have also been 
relatively successful in undermining the argument that CDS could go entirely onto 
regulated exchanges. Exchanges are commodified businesses; they offer high 
transparency and, associated with that, high competition and low profits (compared 
to the OTC markets), particularly where entry requirements to the exchange are set 
at a relatively low level (compared, for example, to the $1bn capital requirement 
suggested by the G-14). CCPs offered a hybrid solution that has in effect become 
the accepted goal of the private and public actors; because of their requirements for 
standardisation, they reduce the ability of dealers to produce new customised 
versions of products, although because they lack price transparency, they continue 
to offer higher levels of profitability than regulated exchanges. The CCP model, 
however, comes alongside the argument that non-standardised products must be 
able to continue, an argument strongly pushed by the large banks and brokers. 
Regulators have responded by insisting on more stringent reserve requirements for 
any continued OTC-traded contracts. They have also demanded that all such deals 
be centrally registered. However, where the distinction between standardised and 
non-standardised will exist is still being discussed and will make a significant 
difference to both the rate of expansion of CCPs and the adjustment required by the 
financial institutions to their own models of trading. Private actors have sought to 
keep some space for OTC trading; they have supported the development of CCPs, 
which allows them to continue with bilateral trading and some opacity in pricing. 
What is remarkable is that all this has happened within four years of a massive 
financial crash, significantly attributable to trading in these instruments, and in a 
context, firstly, where banks had to be bailed out by governments, secondly, where 
banks are extremely unpopular, and, thirdly, in an era of fiscal austerity brought 
about to a significant degree by the amount of state funds devoted to rescuing the 
banks. Nevertheless, the banks have been able to rescue and retain some key parts 
of the business model which contributed to all this. In spite of all the contestation, 
law has been reshaped to only a minimal extent and the power of the financial 
institutions, despite its weakening in the aftermath of the crash, has been reasserted. 
On the face of it, there has been broad consensus between private and public 
actors that OTC derivatives should move onto CCPs. However, with each category, 
there have emerged new struggles. The most important new feature amongst private 
actors has been the emergence of exchanges and other back-office organisations as 
central actors in this shift. The potential of CCPs for OTC trading has stimulated a 
further bout of reorganisation amongst the platform providers and these have now 
become an important constituency in the progress of these reforms. The powerful 
actors in the old system – the banks, represented by the G-14 – are engaged in a 
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struggle to make sure that they retain as much of the new business as they can, at 
least in part through supporting rules which restrict the ability to become a member 
of a clearing house – and therefore to take part in trading OTCs – to highly 
capitalised institutions. 
Looking at public action on a global scale, there is a large amount of activity 
amongst industry associations, ad hoc committees of supervisors and regulators, 
together with committees and organisations based around BIS to create a coherent 
response. However, national responses are affected by national priorities and, in the 
case of EU countries, by the emergence of a new level of EU supervisory authority. 
They are also affected by national concerns to have a share of the business and not to 
see a limited number of CCPs concentrated in just a couple of countries. It is too soon 
to see how these different national contexts may affect the distribution of the CCP 
business, but it is certain that this will be highly competitive, another reason why 
exchange mergers are being pushed to maximise economies of scale and scope. 
These different outcomes of reform impact differentially on the actors involved. 
As the response to the financial crisis has shown, private actors move quickly to 
repair markets.44 – and within this, it is the most powerful that move quickest and with 
most deliberation and calculation. Public actors have moved more slowly and because 
the issue of national regulation and regulatory boundaries has become so strongly 
linked to issues of reform, gaining agreement on the detail of the reform to CDS 
markets – as opposed to the principle of reducing OTC trading – has proved difficult. 
In the US, the Obama administration and the Dodd-Frank Act have sought to push 
more derivatives business onto regulated exchanges and CCPs and at a faster speed 
than elsewhere, although much of the detail is now bogged down in negotiations 
between the SEC, the CFTC and the banking lobby. Whilst offering support for the 
US government action, the main European governments and the EU itself are still not 
at implementation stage with their own rules. In London in particular, where cross-
border OTC trading was so strong, there is the most opposition to CCPs and the most 
effort to keep non-standardised contracts as a viable option. 
In conclusion, even the most abstruse and technical of markets (as CDS may 
appear) are subject to social processes. This is not surprising: vast amounts of 
money change hands in these markets, and setting the rules in ways which suit the 
powerful actors whilst hiding behind technocratic and expert-driven discourses 
about market efficiency is an expected response. Politicians and regulators often 
find it difficult to respond coherently, and this creates unevenness and uncertainty 
and with it the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. By studying these markets in 
more detail, it is possible to reveal the choices that are being made and, at least in 
part, to get behind discourses of efficiency to an understanding of the interests 
being served. 
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